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PATENTS AND .ANTITRUST LAw. By Ward S. Bowman, Jr. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1973. Pp. xii, 272. $10.50. 
For one who has spent half a professional lifetime trying to ra-
tionalize the relationship between the patent and the antitrust laws, 
Professor Bowman's book is real help. The book's basic conclusions 
appear to be sound, and the book should be required reading for 
those lawmakers, jurists, and practitioners who venture into the 
crosscurrents of patent and antitrust law. 
The author begins by arguing that "[b ]oth antitrust law and pa-
tent law have a common central economic goal: to maximize wealth 
by producing what consumers want at the lowest cost" (p. l) (empha-
sis original). Various criticisms of the patent system itself are dis-
missed, and alternative proposals for rewardi11g invention are ex-
amined and rejected as less likely to achieve the desired objective 
(pp. 15-32). 
Pronouncing the patent system economically sound and worthy 
of continued support, Professor Bqwman turns to the ·system's 
method of rewarding invention-a limited temporary monopoly on 
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the often unrealistic option of keeping the invention to himself and 
manufacturing, selling and/ or using the invention alone, the only 
way for the inventor to exploit the patent is to license others to use 
the invention. Following an economic analysis of.the operation of use 
restrictions and price restrictions in patent licenses, the author con-
cludes that these restrictions can serve only to maximize the p1tten-
tee's income, thus achieving the objective of rewarding inventiveness. 
Professor Bowman convincingly maintains that, contrary to current 
case law and Department of Justice policy, no use restriction or price 
restriction in a patent license can in any way create a monopoly or 
tend to create a monopoly beyond the legitimate monopoly granted 
by the patent (pp. 53-139). 
After a discussion of the pre-Clayton Act cases involving the legal-
ity of use restrictions in patent licenses (pp. 140-62), the author ana-
lyzes the decisions since 1917 that have imposed greater and greater 
restrictions on the patent owner's right to license his invention 
(pp. 163-238). Professor Bowman's conclusions are an ind.ictment of 
the courts, and particularly of the Supreme Court: 
But spurious and unarticulated motivations aside, the most fre-
quently cited reason for prohibiting patentees from imposing various 
use-restrictive contracts upon licensees has been a finding that the 
proper scope of the patent monopoly has been exceeded. 
In applying its scope test-a test which implicitly, at least, in-
volves an economic appraisal of profit maximization under a valid 
patent as contrasted to monopoly extension into inappropriate areas 
-the Supreme Court has mostly been mistaken. And its mistakes 
come from getting the wrong answers to the right questions. No care-
ful distinction between monopoly maximization and monopoly ex-
tension has been articulated and consistently applied. The Supreme 
Court's facility for finding a leveraging process by which one monop-
oly becomes two (or more) monopolies is particularly notable. Ex-
amples have been provided in case after case. In addition, under 
both patent-misuse law and antitrust law, there is an increasing 
propensity to apply a foreclosure test. Emphasis is -thus focused on 
competitors rather than upon competition (or, more appropriately, 
the competitive process). Equating effect on competitors with effect 
on competition is a dubious hypothesis which the Court tends to 
adopt as an obvious conclusion. This persists even though there has 
been neither legislative nor judicial adoption of the proposition that 
inefficient competitors are to be favored over a consumer-benefitting 
competitive process . 
. . . It should not be surprising, therefore, as monopolization my-
thology has gained the upper hand in the antitrust arena, that what 
some viewed as intensified conflict between patent law and antitrust 
law turns out to be compatibility, albeit a compatibility in error. 
Neither should it be a cause for surprise that this development has 
called for cures from antitrust diseases, phantom and real, which are 
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more harmful to the competitive process than the maladies them-
selves. 
Antitrust law, including the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman 
Act, and the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Fair Trade acts, in addi-
tion to the Sherman Act, has become increasingly stringent with re-
spect to vertical integrations and vertical contracts-contracts not 
benveen competitors but between suppliers and their customers or 
benveen buyers and their sources of supply. Many if not most patent 
licensing contracts are of this type. Included are the tie-in sales, ex-
clusive licensing, territorial division, discriminating licensing and 
price-restrictive licenses analyzed in preceding chapters. These con-
tractual arrangements are often means by which patentees are able to 
"efficiently" recover that value which is measured by customer evalua-
tion of the competitive superiority afforded by the patent .... [T]hese 
vertical contracts not only are "efficient" as profit-maximizing devices 
for those who employ them, but they also can be, and mostly are, effi-
cient in the social sense. They can be means of getting more of what 
the community wants at lower overall cost than if their use were pro-
hibited. [Pp. 240-41.] 
While Professor Bowman's indictment appears to be soundly 
based, it is too much to expect an overnight about-face by the courts 
or the federal regulatory agencies. Forty years of mythology and wrong 
thinking cannot be easily overcome. Attempts by counsel for patent 
owners in future litigation to obtain a realistic weighing of the com-
petition-promoting against the competition-restricting aspects of a 
given patent license agreement may be thwarted by per se patent mis-
use pronouncements or dicta gleaned from earlier cases. 
The only way Professor Bowman's conclusions could quickly be-
come law would be by congressional action, and the legislative cli-
mate for such action seems lacking. However, each new litigated case 
in which the legality of the terms of a patent license is attacked logi-
cally requires a rational and independent analysis by the court of the 
economic merits of those terms ~ccused of misuse. Thus, the opportu-
nity still presents itself to diligent counsel for the patent owner to de-
fend the accused license terms as economically justifiable and logi-
cally incapable of any tendency to create a monopoly beyond that 
granted by the patent. In these endeavors, Professor Bowman's book 
should provide considerable assistance. . 
Professor Bowman's criticism of the prevailing protectionist 
attitude that underlies recent court decisions denying effect to re-
strictive patent licenses finds support in the review of his book by 
University of Pennsylvania economist Oliver Williamson.1 Ac-
cording to Professor Williamson, vertical market restrictions imposed 
by patent licenses can and often do lead to allocative efficiency gains.2 
I. 83 YALE L.J. 647 (1974). 
2. Id. at 659. 
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He urges the antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts to apply 
a case-by-case economic efficiency test when examining patent li-
censing arrangements. 
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